英国《经济学人》8月5日刊发长篇评论文章，深入分析了中国安徽省合肥市的城市发展路径，称“合肥模式”赋能城市经济高质量发展，并为中国其他城市发展提供实践范例。合肥崛起成为出人意料的黑马，“合肥模式”对带动新一轮城市经济提升有着借鉴价值。本文刊载《经济学人》文章核心观点，以期传播“合肥发展样板”，启发中国城市因地制宜探寻经济高质量发展之路。
据英国《经济学人》周刊网站8月5日报道，漫步“量子大道”，看到的是世界上分布最为集中的一批尖端科技企业。数十家公司撑起了几年前还不存在的一条量子计算产业链。它们的产品涉及地球上最先进的一些商业化技术。这片区域存在的时间还不到10年。
中国经济创造的奇迹，在合肥大地上展现出充足的活力。2012年到2022年，这座内陆城市的地区生产总值年均增速超过8%。合肥曾被认为既落后又贫困，如今这里居民的可支配收入已超过中国城市居民的平均水平。
2002-2022年，合肥城镇居民人均可支配收入相较于中国平均水平的百分比。
报道称，这座城市的成功在很大程度上要归功于独树一帜地将地方政府投资与民营企业相结合的做法，一些人称之为“合肥模式”。这一发展模式培育出了高端制造业、电动汽车、生物科技和半导体等产业。这些战略性新兴产业如今在合肥工业产值中占比超过56%，相比之下，2013年时这一比例还不足27%。
在此过程中，中国会通过牢牢掌握全新的产业及其供应链，摆脱“低质量”增长。合肥的技术进步与第四次工业革命相呼应。
据报道，京东方是液晶显示屏领域的全球领军企业，它的一些主要工厂就建在合肥。世界上发展最快的电动汽车企业之一蔚来汽车也是如此。中国语音识别人工智能技术的领跑者科大讯飞是由当地大学的学生创办的。
外资企业也对合肥的发展效率给予认可。德国大众汽车在合肥的制造厂已运行多年。今年早些时候，它宣布要在合肥设立创新中心，助力电动汽车的设计。这样的技术中心此前很少设在中国沿海大城市以外的地方，对跨国企业来说尤其如此。
据报道，合肥的成功引起了许多人的好奇。许多地区组团访问这座城市。
来访的其他城市官员很快就会了解到“合肥模式”的基本要素。首先是拥有一大批受过高等教育且积极进取的人才。合肥是不折不扣的内陆城市，这让它错过了上世纪90年代长三角取得的飞速发展。但是，它与周边经济状况较好的省市离得又比较近，足以吸收它们产生的影响。
位于合肥的中国科学技术大学如今正崛起为全球科技中心。中国科大周围的教育体系也在蓬勃发展，让这座城市拥有众多实力雄厚的高等院校。
“合肥模式”的第二个要素是人才流动。市政府经常从当地大学的理工院系招聘人才，同时鼓励政府部门、大学院系和企业之间展开交流，建立互信。当地一名干部曾在担任政府公职的同时，在中国科大花费多年时间帮助科研人员确定适销对路的专利产品。
第三个要素是产业链“链长”机制。政府在半导体、电动汽车、量子科学和生物技术等12个领域打造了产业集群。每个产业集群都有一个“链长”：负责监管产业总体规划的政府官员。
晶合集成生产的12英寸晶圆。合肥日报全媒体记者 张大岗 摄
“合肥模式”的第四个要素是国有资本。合肥市政府把钱投入它认为最有发展前途的企业。
报道称，在一座城市开展的试验往往为其他地方树立了样板。例如，上世纪80年代的“深圳模式”开了中国劳动力与外资相结合的先河，把中国南方地区变成了全世界的工厂。差不多同一时期，“温州模式”证明了通常由家庭储蓄提供资金的家庭作坊式生产模式也可以取得成功。
一些内陆城市具备与合肥类似的起步条件，比如雄厚的教育实力和产业基础。这些地区或许可以在一定程度上复制合肥的投资策略。
向上滑动阅览《经济学人》报道原文
An unlikely tech cluster exemplifies China’s economic vision
A stroll down “Quantum Boulevard” reveals one of the world’s tightest concentrations of bleeding-edge technology firms. Dozens of companies feed a quantum-computing supply chain that did not exist a few years ago. Their wares include some of the most advanced commercialised technology on the planet. The district is hardly a decade old; not long ago the most modern tech in the area was farming equipment. And it is in an unlikely spot: Hefei, the capital of Anhui, one of China’s less fancied provinces.
China’s growth is flagging, but its economic miracle appears alive and well in Hefei. Home to about 9.6m people, the inland city saw its GDP grow by more than 8% a year on average from 2012 to 2022. Once considered backward and poor, Hefei’s residents now enjoy a disposable income that comfortably exceeds China’s urban average (see chart).
The city’s success owes much to what some call the “Hefei model”. A unique combination of local-government investment and private enterprise, the model has been described as state capitalism at its best. It has fostered industries like high-end manufacturing, electric vehicles (EVs), biotech and semiconductors. These so-called strategic, emerging industries now account for over 56% of Hefei’s industrial output, compared with less than 27% in 2013. Whatever local officials have been doing, it appears to be “the right mix of industrial policy and private-sector mojo,” says Robin Xing, an economist at Morgan Stanley and a Hefei local.
This style of growth is precisely how, China’s leader, envisions the country’s future. Hefei’s technological progress chimes with Mr Xi’s call for an “Industrial Revolution 4.0”, in which China shakes off “low-quality” growth—cheap manufacturing and debt-financed homebuilding—by capturing entirely new industries and their supply chains. This vision reserves special attention for the inland backwaters that have missed out on much of the internet boom in coastal provinces. If Mr Xi has his way, the next decade of development will look more like Hefei than today’s tech hubs of Shenzhen and Hangzhou.
BOE Technology, the world leader in LCD displays, has some of its main factories in Hefei. So does NIO, one of the world’s fastest-growing ev companies. China’s leader in voice-recognition artificial intelligence, iFlyTek, was founded by the local university. Its most advanced DRAM chipmaker, CXTM, was co-founded by the local government.
Foreign companies have also endorsed Hefei’s efficiency. Volkswagen, a German carmaker, has operated manufacturing plants in the city for years. Earlier this year it announced plans for a €1bn ($1.1bn) innovation centre in Hefei that will help design evs. Such hubs are rare outside China’s largest coastal cities, especially for multinationals. Few inland areas can muster the talent, logistics and supply chains to foster them. But Hefei has the right conditions to set up such a facility, says Ralf Brandst?tter, Volkswagen’s China chief.
Boulevard of unbroken dreams
Hefei’s success has stirred plenty of curiosity. Delegation after delegation of officials from less prosperous regions have visited the city in the hopes of taking some economic magic back home. A staff member at a state investment group in Hefei says his firm is booked to capacity over the next month hosting visitors from other city governments.
They will quickly learn the model’s essential ingredients. The first is a large pool of highly educated, motivated people. Hefei is far enough inland—about 470km from Shanghai—to have missed out on the 1990s boom in the Yangzi river delta. But it is close enough to absorb the influence of its better-off neighbours, giving it what Anhui locals say is a scrappy, underdog attitude.
During the Cultural Revolution, a politically tumultuous period between 1966 and 1976, the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC) was forced to leave Beijing. The nation’s top tech college tried several cities before settling in Hefei in 1970. In the flight from political violence, often directed at academics, it lost more than half its scholars and equipment.
But utsc has now re-emerged as a global centre for science. The surrounding education system has also flourished, giving the city a high density of good schools, notes Christopher Marquis, the co-author of “Mao and Markets: The Communist Roots of Chinese Enterprise”.
That has made it a hub for advanced technology. USTC has designed China’s most advanced quantum computer. Not far away at the Institute of Physics, scientists are testing one of the world’s most advanced fusion-energy reactors, the Experimental Advanced Superconducting Tokamak. The earliest human trials with CRISPR, a genetic-engineering tool, were conducted at a Hefei hospital in 2015. Since then a thriving biosciences industry has sprung up.
A second ingredient of the Hefei model is the flow of talent. The city government frequently recruits from the engineering and science departments of local universities. It also encourages exchanges between government offices, university departments and companies, building trust and networks. One local cadre spent years at USTC helping researchers identify marketable patents, while holding a government position. Businesspeople in Hefei say officials throughout the local administration can discuss industry topics in depth.
A third factor is the “chain boss” system. The government has created groups of firms in 12 industries, including semiconductors, EVs, quantum sciences and biotechnology. Each group has a “chain boss”: a government official who oversees big-picture planning for the industry. In 2020, for example, Hefei’s Communist Party chief was the chain boss of the city’s integrated-circuits industry. The mayor oversaw the display-screen industry.
These bosses work with a state-appointed “chain leader”, typically the dominant company within an industry. The government passes policy directions to this leader, which shares them with other companies in the supply chain. Companies and officials use this communication channel to discuss the allocation of state capital, the sourcing of materials and potential bottlenecks in supplies, noted Ni Hua, an analyst at East Asia Qianhai Securities, in a report last year.
Before the state invests in a new company, officials consult with all members of a chain to understand how the newcomer will fit in, says an executive at a local quantum-computing firm. One young entrepreneur who recently started a business in Hefei says that breaking into these industry groups is incredibly difficult. There is little scope for ruthless competition within supply chains. Instead the focus is on beating companies in other regions or countries.
The fourth ingredient in the model is state capital. While cities elsewhere in the world fund schools, build sewers or house the poor, Hefei’s administration ploughs money into the most promising companies it can identify. It has been described as a “government of investment bankers”. Its outlays flow mainly through three vehicles. Each has sprawling portfolios spanning hundreds of investments.
Chained melody
These investments give the city government broad reach. Companies such as BOE, the display-maker, and NIO, the ev firm, stand at the centre of vast supply chains. Smaller companies move to Hefei to be closer to them. Most remain privately owned. But if they suit the government’s plan for the supply chain, they will probably attract some state investment. In this way entire supply chains are linked up by just a few state investors that answer to the city government.
For nearly a decade cities and provinces across China have been experimenting with state-backed venture capital, raising as much as $1trn. But many of their investments have yielded mediocre returns at best. China’s venture-capital state has been written off as a cash sink and a prime opportunity for corruption. Last year, for example, anti-corruption authorities rounded up executives at China’s premier state fund, the National Integrated Circuit Fund, in an attempt to weed out graft.
What sets Hefei apart? The city’s state capitalists have clearly benefited from the city’s history and location. Not every inland metropolis can learn from Shanghai without being swamped by it, or provide refuge to a great university. The tight links of the “chain boss” system also ensure that Hefei’s state capitalists do not invest without guidance from industry.
Hefei’s state investors have also been unusually adventurous. Most cities lack the expertise to run private-equity funds. And they do not have incentives to make bets with distant, uncertain pay-offs. Cadres often spend just five years in one location. Even if a long-term investment were to succeed, they would not be around to enjoy their triumph. These short horizons inhibit officials’ investment choices. Many government funds, for example, have put money into chip designers not chipmakers, notes Tilly Zhang, an analyst at Gavekal Dragonomics, a research house. Chip design is less capital-intensive and quicker to show returns.
Hefei’s state capitalists have no such inhibition. The local government’s first big punt was a $5.2bn investment in BOE in 2008. (Officials delayed the construction of a subway system in order to scrape the funds together.) The LCD screen industry was then dominated by South Korea and Japan. Critics noted that it would take years to for Chinese firms to be able to compete. But BOE eventually built several plants in Hefei and has since come to dominate the global industry.
NIO, the electric-car maker, was even riskier. In 2020 the group was on the verge of collapse when Hefei invested 5bn yuan ($700m). nio then moved its China headquarters and some production facilities to the city. In less than two years NIO had recovered and its share price soared. The city made a return of up to 5.5 times its initial investment, according to Bloomberg. Hefei Jiantou, a government fund that invested in both BOE and NIO, has taken in investment income of at least 5bn yuan each year between 2019 and 2021.
For Mr Xi’s economic vision to succeed, the Hefei model will have to spread far beyond its place of origin. Smaller cities will have to sprout big firms in leading industries, such as EVs, solar energy and chips. One quantum boulevard will not be enough.
But experimentation in one city has often provided a template for the rest of the country. The “Shenzhen model” in the 1980s, for example, pioneered the combination of Chinese labour and foreign capital that turned southern China into the workshop of the world. Around the same time the “Wenzhou model”, named after the south-eastern port city, showed that household factories, often financed by family savings, could succeed, with the help of peripatetic sales agents travelling up and down the country.
Can the Hefei model also be exported? Several inland cities have similar starting conditions, such as good schools and strong industrial bases. Such places might be able to replicate some of Hefei’s investment strategies, says Mr Xing.
But Hefei’s success suggests that education, industry and geography are not enough. Political incentives must also align. Mr Xi frequently demands loyalty and austerity from his cadres. The Hefei model, on the other hand, requires gumption and daring. State capitalists must be prepared to take the kind of risky bets that do not always pay off. The model cannot succeed in other cities unless their local cadres are free to fail.
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英媒《经济学人》稿件译文主要内容：
解读科技集群奇迹，深入理解中国经济
——“合肥模式”或难以复制
过去十多年，量子计算从无到有，实现迅速崛起。众多尖端高科技企业汇聚“量子大道”，密度之高堪称世界之最。其中，数十家企业深耕量子计算，已经具备最先进的产业化成果。然而，十几年前，这块区域还是一片农田，农用机械是这里最先进的设备。这一切发生在一个关注度不高的地方：安徽省省会——合肥。
合肥近年来持续创造经济奇迹。这座拥有960多万人口的内陆城市，从 2012 年到 2022 年，国内生产总值年均增长超过8%，其居民可支配收入超过中国城市平均水平。
合肥发展很大程度上归功于业内所称的“合肥模式”。具体来说，就是政府投资与企业发展相结合，从而形成一种颇具地方特色的运作模式。该模式成功培育了高端制造、电动汽车、生物技术和半导体等一批战略性新兴产业集群。2022年，合肥市战新产业占比突破56%，而十年前，这一比例还不到27%。正如来自合肥本地的摩根士丹利经济师邢自强所说，当地政府成功让产业政策与民营企业产生碰撞，带来奇妙的化学反应。
“合肥模式”精准诠释了中国领导人习近平主席对中国未来的宏观规划。合肥的科技进步，响应了习近平主席有关“工业革命4.0”的号召，摆脱了以廉价工业品和负债型房地产为特征的“低质量增长”模式，转而追求以全新产业及供应链为支撑的高质量发展。这对于错失互联网风口的内陆省份来说，颇具吸引力。
全球LCD显示龙头企业京东方、全球发展最快的新能源车企蔚来、中国在人工智能语音识别领域的龙头企业科大讯飞，都坐落于合肥。
外资企业同样看重合肥的办事效率。多年前，德国大众在合肥开始建设制造基地。今年年初，大众宣布加码10亿欧元在合肥成立新能源汽车研发中心。对于产业巨头而言，尤其是知名跨国企业，云集在一座非沿海城市，实属罕见。其他内陆城市很难像合肥一样，汇聚这么多人才、物流和供应链企业来支撑城市发展。但正如大众中国CEO贝瑞德所说，合肥凭借“天时、地利、人和”做到了。
合肥的成功激起了不少人的好奇。许多地区的政府代表团接踵而至，希望学到成功经验并带回去。合肥市国有投资集团的一位职员说，公司下个月的接待日程已满。对他们而言，了解“合肥模式”无需花费太长时间。
“合肥模式”的第一大要素是汇聚高素质人才，激发创业活力。合肥是内陆城市，远离上海约470公里，错过了20世纪90年代长三角地区的爆发增长期。但合肥距离周边发达城市不远，深受其影响，正如当地人的说法，逐渐形成了一种“落后，而又不甘落后”的品性。当年，中国科大搬离北京，曾接触好几个城市，最终于1970年选择落户合肥。如今的中国科大再度跃升为全球科学中心，教育配套体系也随之蓬勃发展，为合肥回馈了丰富的优质教育资源。合肥因而成为先进技术的中心：中国科大拥有最先进的量子计算机；中科院合肥物质科学研究院的全超导托卡马克，是世界上最先进的聚变能反应堆；合肥一家医院早在2015年就开始用基因编辑工具（CRISPR）开展试验。此后，生命科学产业如雨后春笋般蓬勃发展。
“合肥模式”的第二大要素是促进人才流动。合肥市政府经常从当地高校的理工科学院招揽人才，同时鼓励政府、高校与企业进行人员交流，建立联络与互信。例如，一位干部可以既在政府任职，还可在中国科大帮助科研人员确定更具市场前景的专利。当地的企业家表示，合肥的干部上上下下都懂产业。
“合肥模式”的第三大要素是实行“链长制”。合肥市聚焦半导体、新能源汽车、量子科学、生物技术等12个重点产业，建立产业集群，每个集群都由负责该产业发展整体规划的政府官员担任“链长”。例如，2020年，合肥市委书记担任集成电路产业链链长，市长担任显示产业链链长。在“链长制”下，龙头企业担任政府指定的“链主”，负责与“链长”协同合作，了解政策导向后分享给供应链上下游企业。除此之外，东亚前海证券研究团队发布报告指出，企业和政府官员可借助该渠道讨论国有资产分配、材料来源与供应链潜在瓶颈等问题。当地一家量子计算企业管理层称，政府在投资一家新公司前，政府会咨询产业链所有成员，研判新公司如何融入产业链。一位刚在合肥创业的年轻企业家称，想进入这些产业集群不容易，但是一旦进入，链内企业不会自相残杀，竞争的焦点反而是其他地区或其他国家的同行。
“合肥模式”的第四大要素是科学规划国有资本，选择将国有资本投入到其认为最有发展前景的公司。因此，合肥被称为最佳“政府投行”——依托三大国资平台进行投资，每个平台都有数百个庞大的投资组合。
国有资本投资为合肥市政府带来了广泛的影响力。在庞大供应链体系中，京东方和蔚来这样的企业都处于中心位置，中小企业更愿意搬到合肥，离大企业更近些。虽然大多数中小企业是民营企业，但如果符合政府的产业规划，就有可能拿到政府投资。因此，政府可以通过少量的国资平台串联起整个供应链。
合肥的国资平台为何能独树一帜？这除了与城市的历史和地理位置有关，“链长制”的一环扣一环也确保了国资平台受到行业指导。同时，合肥的国资平台也敢于出手。2008年，合肥市政府投入52亿美元引入京东方。这对合肥而言无疑是一笔巨款，为了筹措资金，合肥甚至缓建地铁。当时，液晶显示行业由韩国和日本主导，有观点认为中国需要好几年才能和日韩一较高下。然后，京东方最终在合肥落子数家工厂，引领全球行业发展。2020年，蔚来濒临破产时，合肥市政府向“蔚来”输血50亿元人民币，让蔚来中国总部和一些生产基地落户合肥。从命悬一线到股价飙升，蔚来仅用了不到两年。据彭博社报道，该项投资回报率高达5.5倍。2019年至2021年，京东方和蔚来背后的合肥建投每年至少获得50亿元的投资收入。
“合肥模式”绝不能止步于合肥，“量子大道”决不能仅有一条，规模较小的城市必须在电动汽车、太阳能和芯片等主导产业里培育出大企业。
但是，一个城市的试点往往为整个国家提供了样板。例如，“深圳模式”在上世纪80年代开创了中国劳动力与外资结合的先河，将华南地区变成了世界工厂。同一时期，“温州模式”表明有了全国各地跑生意的温州人，家庭作坊也能成功。“合肥模式”能否被复制？中国有几个内陆城市具备类似的先天条件，例如优质的教育资源和强大的产业基础，或许可以一试。
来 源：《经济学人》杂志、参考消息、合肥发布、合肥日报
“市场化思维”运营城市方能逆袭“翻盘”
在当下城市高质量发展的时代要求下，城市与城市间的竞争本质上是发展思路的竞争，发展模式的竞争。“合肥模式”的样板意义在于，依托高等教育人才、产业链“链长”机制、国有资本等核心要素，聚力创新打法，勇于“破”，敢于“创”，奋力“闯”，选准了韧性强、潜力足、发展前景好的风口产业，找到了适合其高质量发展的成功密码。王牌智库认为，“合肥模式”的样板价值有四：
一是政府与民营企业形成合力，政企联合，蓄势发力谋经济，形成有为政府和有效市场的“双剑合璧”。这种一改行政化思维的解放思想探索模式，一方面，能够形成政府强力支持的“背书效应”，用好市场化思维和手段运营，以便政策扶持、政府服务能够很好地贯彻落实到产业发展中；另一方面，政企联合集聚要素发展经济，能够针对性地强弱项、扬优势，发挥核心优势，为合肥工业及经济总量注入强劲动能，这对于各地发展具有借鉴参考价值。
二是围绕科技创新驱动产业发展做顶层设计，掌握了产业投融资的核心，锚定高端制造、新能源汽车、生物技术和半导体等战略性新兴产业“风口”，掌握“核心科技”，打通核心通道。搭建包括集成电路、新能源汽车、生物技术在内的多条主导产业链“链长”机制，找准通向“产业强市”总发展战略的路径，便于围绕“风口”产业和产业链关键环精准投资，便于通过“芯屏汽合”“集终生智”等重点产业链，利于纵深拉宽、拉大产业投融资格局。
三是优化人才引进和培育环境，围绕着经济发展的主导产业如电子信息、节能环保、新材料等八大战略性新兴产业，建立专业产业技术人才和队伍，形成了完整的人才政策招引体系，把“专业人做专业事发挥到极致”。人才是发展的核心动能支持，合肥的做法对于解决“卡脖子”难题的意义重大。
四是国资引领“逆袭”，打造“基金+产业”“基金+基地”“基金+项目”等多种模式。聚焦主导产业设立政府基金，针对产业链上下游、关键环节设立专项政府投资基金或市场化联合投资基金，形成产业上下游各环节链接、企业孵化成长、全生命周期覆盖的政府产业投资基金矩阵。这对国有资本的保值增值、做大做强及产业快速发展大有裨益。
扛起中国民间政府智库的大旗
王牌智库深圳总部：
深圳市福田区滨河大道9289号京基滨河时代广场A座14层
王牌智库河南公司：
郑州市郑东新区商鼎路69号泰宏国际广场B座20层
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